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Abstract
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is a multidimensional con-
cept that involves several aspects, ranging from Environment, to Social
and Governance. Companies aiming to comply with CSR standards
have to face challenges that vary from one aspect to the other and
from one industry to the other. Latent variable models may be use-
fully employed to provide a unidimensional measure of the grade of
compliance of a firm with CSR standards that is both understand-
able and theoretically solid. A methodology based on Item Response
Theory has been implemented on the multidimensional sustainability
rating as expressed by KLD dataset from 1991 to 2007. Results sug-
gest that companies in the industry Oil & Gas together with firms
in Industrials, Basic Materials and Telecommunications have a higher
difficulty to meet the CSR standards. Criteria based on Human rights,
Environment, Community and Product quality have a large capacity
to select the best performing firms, as they are very discriminant, while
Governance does not exhibit similar behavior. A stock selection based
on the ranking of the firms according to the proposed CSR measure
supports the hypothesis of a positive relationship between CSR and
financial performance.
JEL Classification: C40; G11; G14
Keywords: Item Response Theory; Latent Variable Models; Portfolio
management; Ranking; Socially Responsible Investment.






Socially Responsible Investments (SRI) have become a widespread practice
in most industrialized countries, as the share of investors aware of the threats
posed by companies that violate environmental and social standards is grow-
ing. Estimates of the Social Investment Forum (US-SIF) indicate that at
the end of 2011 about one out of every nine dollars under professional man-
agement in the US was invested along this line, with an increase of 22% over
the period end 2009 - end 2011 (US-SIF, 2012).
Responsible investors or portfolio managers with a SRI mandate aim
to integrate Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) criteria with the usual
risk/return trade-off. One common strategy is to consider only a few of
these aspects, for example including in the investment set only stocks that
are high ranked in “Environment” or excluding stocks operating in con-
troversial fields, such as tobacco, alcohol or weapon production. Different
strategies have different impacts on the portfolio’s financial performance. A
fundamental question for investors, which is at the center of a vast debate,
is whether there is a negative or a positive association between financial
performance and the various SRI strategies; see Section 2 for a review.
We argue that CSR has a multidimensional nature covering various di-
mensions related to Environmental, Social and Governance issues. A unidi-
mensional quantitative syntheses of all the available information is a desir-
able requirement. Indeed, rating agencies, such as Asset4 or Sustainalytics,
form a linear combination of different indicators to provide the users with a
single score that measures the overall CSR compliance of a company. A sur-
vey of 43 publications, made by Chen and Delmas (2011), found that only
8 did not use aggregating methods. Out of the remaining 35, 9 used linear
aggregating methods with unequal weights, while 26 used simple average, a
procedure that is often criticized as it gives all aspects the same weight, see
Hopkins (2005).
Linear weighting schemes with unequal weights are more theoretically
grounded. However, the issue is on how to choose weights. Ruf, Muralid-
har, and Paul (1998) assign weights that take into account the preferences
of different stakeholders, while Waddock and Graves (1997) developed a sys-
tem based on experts’ opinions. However, a linear combination of the CSR
scores with subjective weighting of the CSR aspects is prone to criticism,
as the resulting overall CSR performance of a company depends strongly on
the choice which is often considered arbitrary (Bird, Hall, Momente, and
Reggiani, 2007). Moreover, weights can be no longer adequate when applied
to a different dataset or to the same dataset but at different time points
(Rowley and Berman, 2000). An approach based on Data Envelopment
Analysis, which is independent of any subjective a priori weight specifica-
tion and can be implemented on different datasets, was first introduced by
Bendheim, Waddock, and Graves (1998) and later extended by Chen and
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Delmas (2011).
In this paper we suggest that latent variable models (Skrondal and Rabe-
Hesket, 2004) may provide a tool to capture the firm’s grade of compliance
with CSR standards, by postulating a model that links the observable mea-
surements of CSR aspects to a unidimensional trait, which is latent, and that
we call “CSR ability”. We use Item Response Models (see De Boeck and
Wilson, 2004) to extract the one-dimensional latent variable. Item Response
Models weight differently and in a non linear way the different dimensions
of CSR. The influence of each aspect on the total ability depends on its
capacity to discriminate well behaving companies from the others. Further-
more, as compliance with CSR standards may imply additional costs that
vary across industries, any analysis that does not explicitly take this issue
into account is confounded (Benson, Brailsford, and Humphrey, 2006). The
proposed model allows an industry effect on CSR ability.
The Item Response model has been implemented yearly from 1991 to
2007 on the KLD rating system,1 that measures the CSR performances of
firms in the US with respect to seven dimensions capturing Corporate Gov-
ernance, Environment and Social issues. Results show that in general the
CSR ability is most influenced by criteria based on Human rights, Environ-
ment, Community and Product quality. Companies in Oil&Gas as well as
in Industrials, Basic Materials and Telecommunications have a higher diffi-
culty to get high CSR ratings. Therefore, given a certain pattern of CSR
ratings, a company in one of the difficult industries will receive an ability
score higher than a company in another industry.
The CSR ability is used to rank companies and construct high and low
ranked (equally weighted, value weighted and mean-variance optimal) port-
folios. The proposed measure is used as a criterion for stock selection to
investigate the impact that the integration of CSR criteria in the invest-
ment strategies has on the portfolios’ financial performance, as measured by
the Jensen’s α in the Carhart’s model. A comparison between SR and con-
ventional funds has been done for example in Statman (2000) and Bauer,
Koedijk, and Otten (2005), where no significative differences were found
between their financial performances, and in Nofsinger and Varma (2013),
where it was found that SR funds outperformed conventional funds dur-
ing the global financial crisis. However, a comparison between investment
funds can be altered by managerial skills and expenses that vary between
funds. On the contrary, following Kempf and Osthoff (2007) and Statman
and Glushkov (2009), we compare the performance of hand-made strategies,
or indexes, constructed on the basis of the CSR, avoiding in such a way this
confounding effect. We find that the high ranked strategies outperform the
1It is theoretically possible to estimate the model simultaneously to all years, how-
ever, it would lead to serious problems of non-identifiability and instability as the ranked
companies vary from one year to the other.
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low ranked ones in terms of the Jensen’s α. Similar conclusions are in Kempf
and Osthoff (2007) and Statman and Glushkov (2009). For the sake of com-
parison, portfolios are formed also on the basis of 4 other known rankings
used in literature, see Section 4.2. Results show that the proposed ranking
outperforms, in terms of statistical significance and robustness, three of the
four rankings analyzed for comparison.
There is not a clear evidence in literature that the CSR’s impact on fi-
nancial performance is positive. Rather, as it is widely reviewed in Section
2, results vary depending on the period, the CSR aspects and the measure
of financial performance/risk considered. Our proposal is mainly method-
ological and aims to foster the use of theoretically robust methods, based
on latent variable models, to describe the phenomenon and to adequately
measure the ability of a firm to comply with CSR standards, which is a la-
tent construct. Since the class of latent variable models is rather large, they
can be implemented on other rating databases, with different measurement
schemes, leading to aggregated measures that do not depend on a priori
subjective choices of weights.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief
review of the literature on SRI while in Section 3 an introduction of la-
tent variable models is given. In Section 4 a description of the CSR data
is provided and ways to aggregate positive and negative ratings of KLD
are reviewed. The Item Response model is described in Section 5 while in
Section 6 a qualitative discussion of the main features of the proposed mea-
sure is given. Section 7 details the evolution over time as results from the
model estimates. In Section 8 results on low and high ranked portfolios are
illustrated and in Section 9 some conclusions are presented.
2 Socially Responsible Investments
The main concern of both Socially Responsible (SR) investors and conven-
tional ones is financial profitability. Therefore the issue of whether there
is a positive, negative or neutral association between CSR practise and fi-
nancial performance is a crucial question. CSR implies costs and benefits
for a company, and their combination affects the stock price. However the
costs/benefits ratio is not the only factor to consider. For example, values-
based investors, who accept a lower performance to obtain non-financial
utility, may affect the stock price negatively, by excluding from their invest-
ment set the stocks of not SR companies. Therefore, behavior of investors
has to be taken into account.
A positive association may exist whenever benefits outweigh the costs,
by creating intangible capital or, viceversa, not performing Socially Respon-
sible (SR) actions may reduce the overall productivity of the firm. Under
this scenario, if the investors underestimate (overestimate) the CSR benefits
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(costs), then the risk-adjusted returns of the stocks that are high ranked in
CSR will be higher than those of the low ranked stocks. Along this line is the
errors-in-expectations hypothesis (see Derwall, Koedijk, and Horst, 2011),
according to which a slow reaction to recognize the impact of CSR prac-
tices on future cash flows explains why SR stocks have higher risk-adjusted
returns.
Empirical studies who find a positive relation are, among others, Bec-
chetti and Ciciretti (2011) who find that companies with good ratings in
Product quality or in Governance reacted better to the Lehman Brothers’
default, and Nofsinger and Varma (2013), who document that SRI funds
outperformed conventional funds during the global financial crisis and, as
such, might be considered as an insurance against the crisis. The Em-
ployment conditions as well as the Community relations have been found
to have a positive relationship with stock returns by Kempf and Osthoff
(2007), and Statman and Glushkov (2009). The Community dimension has
been found to be positively associated with higher financial performance also
by Brammer, Brooks, and Pavelin (2006) and Manescu (2011). Kempf and
Osthoff (2007), and Statman and Glushkov (2009) analyzed also the impact
of different combinations of the CSR aspects on financial performance. In
particular, Kempf and Osthoff (2007) found that the highest abnormal re-
turns were reached by a portfolio of stocks with the highest average rating of
all the considered CSR characteristics and using a best-in-class approach to
correct for the industry effects. Statman and Glushkov (2009) constructed
portfolios by taking the best and worst companies ranked by an industry-
adjusted score. They found that the superior performance of stocks with
the higher CSR scores is particular evident in the long-short portfolio of
the “top-overall” and “bottom-overall” companies, where a “top(bottom)-
overall” company is one in the top(bottom) third of companies by two or
more CSR characteristics and not in the bottom(top) third by any others.
A negative association is bound to be there whenever the costs of com-
pany’s actions to comply with CSR standards outweigh the profits or, vice
versa, if the savings from not performing SR behavior are larger than the im-
plied losses, and the investors overestimate(underestimate) benefits(costs).
Under this scenario, the low ranked stocks outperform the high ranked ones
in terms of risk adjusted returns. As noticed in Manescu (2011), a negative
association may be consistent also with an additional risk premium that
the low ranked stocks carry as they are exposed to a non-sustainability risk
factor that accounts for environmental social or litigation risk. However the
author didn’t find any strong evidence that the difference in risk adjusted
returns can be due to compensation for risk. Another mechanism that may
induce low ranked stocks to have higher performance is described in Heinkel,
Kraus, and Zechner (2001). They propose an equilibrium model that shows
how the exclusion of polluting companies from the investment set may push
down their price, thereby producing higher expected returns, as soon as the
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percentage of SR investors is sufficiently high.
Empirical evidence of a negative association is in Hong and Kacperczyk
(2009), who find that the stocks of companies involved in controversial ac-
tivities have higher performance, and in Becchetti and Ciciretti (2009), who
find that SR stocks are less remunerative but also less risky than the oth-
ers. Further findings of a negative association between environmental or
employment indicators and financial returns are in Brammer et al. (2006).
A weak negative effect of Human rights and Product quality on financial
performance was observed in the more recent period by Manescu (2011).
Finally, a neutral association may arise either if SR actions imply no
additional costs and benefits, or they do imply costs and benefits but their
effects compensate each other. Most studies compared the performances
of ethical and conventional mutual funds and found no statistically signifi-
cant differences between their risk-adjusted returns. Among them, we cite
Hamilton, Jo, and Statman (1993), Statman (2000), and Bauer et al. (2005)
where also evidence is provided that ethical funds tend to be less exposed
to market variability of returns and more growth-oriented than conventional
ones.
3 Latent variable models
In many educational and psychological measurement situations there is an
underlying variable of interest. This variable is often something that is
intuitively understood, such as intelligence or attitude, but it cannot be
measured directly as can height or weight, for example, since it is a concept
rather than a physical dimension. This is what psychometricians refer to as
an unobservable, or latent, trait. Such a variable is easily described via its
attributes, which altogether constitute partial and imperfect measurements.
A review on latent variable models can be found in Skrondal and Rabe-
Hesket (2004).
A primary goal of educational and psychological measurement is the de-
termination of how much of such a latent trait a person possesses. Since
most of the research has dealt with variables such as scholastic, mathemat-
ical or language skills, the generic term “ability” is used in this context.
For this purpose, it is necessary to have a scale of measurement, a ruler
having a given metric. This can be for example a set of questions, or items,
with binary answers taking value 1 if the answer is correct and 0 otherwise.
Models to deal with such a data are called Item Response models. Later
extensions, that we used here, include the possibility to deal with data that
are categorical ordered responses.
Items may possess different capacity to discriminate among people. For
example, all subjects tend to give correct answers to a trivial item or wrong
answers to a difficult one. In both cases, this item is not discriminant and
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therefore the ability of a subject has to be less influenced by the answers
to that item. Furthermore, different background variables, such as gender
or social class, have to be taken into consideration, as their effect may be
in the direction of making an item more complex to some subjects than
for others. If so, a correct answer provided by a subject of one group may
require a higher level of ability than a correct answer provided by a subject
of another group. It then follows that (a) the responses are not permutable
and (b) the same pattern of responses has a different influence on the ability
depending on the personal features of the respondent.
An objective way to extract the ability of subjects has to give different
weights to each item according to its capacity to discriminate among sub-
jects and has to take the effect of background variables into account. In
our context, we want to extract the ability of a firm to fulfill sustainability
standards. Corporate Social Responsibility has a complex structure, usually
measured by several dimensions. If we substitute a generic person with a
generic firm, and we consider each dimension as an item of a measurement
model, after introducing covariates to take into account the effects of in-
dustries, latent variable models can be successfully applied to measure the
socially responsible performance of a firm.
4 Sustainability scores
4.1 The KLD dataset
KLD Research and Analytics2 provides the longest time series of ESG in-
formation. From 1991 to 2000, KLD covered approximately 650 companies
belonging to the Domini 400 Social index3 and/or to the S&P500 index.
In 2001 KLD expanded its coverage to include the largest 1000 US compa-
nies by market capitalization. Since 2003 KLD has provided ratings for the
largest 3000 US firms. KLD has used the names and, since 1995, the CUSIP
codes in order to identify the companies.
Companies are rated according to seven dimensions: Governance, Com-
munity, Diversity, Employee relations, Environment, Human rights, Product
quality. Scores were assigned on the basis of the company’s corporate social
responsibility reports and public information, and after a direct engagement.
KLD released ratings yearly. The scores on the performances of a certain
year were published at the beginning of the following year. The focus here
is on members of either the S&P500 index or the MSCI KLD 400 Social
index4.
2KLD Research and Analytics was acquired by RiskMetrics at the end of 2009. We
here focus on data released prior to the merging.
3The Domini 400 Social index is now called MSCI KLD 400 Social index.
4Financial data were downloaded from Datastream that uses ISIN codes to identify the
companies. Matching the financial data with the KLD data, identified through the names
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For each dimension, KLD considers different qualitative binary indicators
taking values 0 or 1. There are two types of indicators: “strength” and
“concern”. A score 1 in a strength is “positive”, meaning that the company
has a proactive behavior in complying with the standards; on the other
hand, a score 1 in a concern indicator has to be considered as “negative”,
indicating a weakness of the company to satisfy the standards. Ambiguity
arises as a 0 in one indicator can result from either neutral performance
or lack of rating. However, as noticed by Manescu (2011), membership of
S&P500 index or MSCI KLD 400 Social index minimizes the presence of
companies for which a score 0 is due to the latter. In addition, KLD also
provides negative ratings on controversial business issues such as Alcohol,
Gambling, Firearms, Military, Nuclear Power and Tobacco, for negative
screening that consists in excluding from the investment set the stocks of
companies raising a concern in one of those items. As the present analysis is
not focused on negative screening, association with controversial activities
is not considered. For a complete description of the indicators accounted by
KLD see Becchetti and Ciciretti (2009).
Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics of the KLD dataset for years
1991 and 2007, corresponding to the first and the last year in our dataset.
For each dimension, the number of indicators as well as the maximum, the
mean and standard deviation of the distribution of the sum of the corre-
sponding binary indicators are reported for strengths and concerns sepa-
rately. The total number of indicators has varied over the years, from 30
strengths and 24 concerns in 1991 to 40 strengths and 34 concerns in 2007.
Also, the number of strengths and concerns is different from one aspect to the
other. These features hinder comparisons across years and across different
CSR dimensions. Moreover, distributions are mainly centered around the
lowest values with small tails. In Figure 1, the histograms of Environment
and Corporate Governance strengths and concerns are presented, that show
skewness of the univariate distributions. This pattern repeats in most of the
data and gives rise to sparsity of the contingency table obtained, for each
year, by the cross-classifications of companies according to all dimensions.
4.2 Aggregating strengths and concerns
Different ways to aggregate strengths and concerns to form the firm’s overall
score have been presented in the literature and here we review them, as they
will form the benchmark for our proposed measure. An extensive commen-
tary is in Manescu (2011). For each year and for each company p in the
investment set, let spik and c
p
ik be the k-th indicator of, in order, strengths
and concerns in dimension i = 1, . . . , 7. Then the simplest method (see e.g.
Becchetti and Ciciretti, 2011 or Statman and Glushkov, 2009) is to take the
or the CUSIP codes, produced a loss of about 5% in the total market capitalization of our
investment universe as some companies of the KLD dataset were not identifiable.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for KLD dataset
strengths concerns
#indicators max mean sd #indicators max mean sd
Dataset 2007
COM 7 5 0.41 0.81 4 3 0.23 0.47
CGOV 6 3 0.24 0.53 7 4 0.84 0.77
DIV 8 7 1.50 1.51 3 2 0.26 0.48
EMP 6 5 0.71 0.89 5 4 0.80 0.88
ENV 6 4 0.48 0.86 7 5 0.53 1.03
HUM 3 1 0.02 0.14 4 3 0.14 0.40
PRO 4 2 0.15 0.38 4 4 0.62 0.89
Dataset 1991
COM 4 3 0.36 0.62 4 1 0.04 0.20
CGOV 3 1 0.02 0.13 2 1 0.04 0.20
DIV 7 3 0.26 0.57 2 1 0.03 0.17
EMP 6 3 0.24 0.49 4 2 0.12 0.36
ENV 6 2 0.24 0.47 6 5 0.37 0.78
HUM - - - - 2 2 0.15 0.40
PRO 4 2 0.15 0.38 4 2 0.20 0.45
The table shows some descriptive statistics of the KLD dataset in years 2007 and 1991. For
any given dimension, the number of indicators as well as the maximum, the mean and standard
deviation of the distribution of the sum of the corresponding binary indicators are reported for
strengths and concerns separately.
Figure 1: KLD histograms (year 2007)
















Histograms of the strengths and concerns for the Environment and Corporate Governance dimen-
sions in year 2007.
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where ni andmi are, in order, the number of strength and concern indicators
for dimension i in the year considered. Since these numbers vary from one
year to another and from one dimension to another, the first limitation of
this method is that it prevents comparisons across years and across dimen-
sions. The other criticism is related to the industry effect: if in a particular
industry a given concern is not possible, then firms in that industry would
receive inflated scores. The distortion induced by the industry effect can be
counterbalanced by a best-in-class approach, that in fact is applied both by
Kempf and Osthoff (2007) and Manescu (2011).
The first drawback of the previous measure is avoided by the measure
in Kempf and Osthoff (2007). The authors propose first to convert the
weaknesses into strengths by taking the complements to 1, i.e. by building
c¯kpi = 1− c
k
pi. By doing so, for a particular firm p: if a weakness k is present
than c¯kpi = 0 and it becomes 1 otherwise. Then, they form the sum of the












which ranges from 0 to 1. The industry effect, however, still remains and
again, without adjustment, some firms would receive inflated scores, depend-
ing on their industry. Another criticism is that the same weight is given to
“not having a weakness”, that in its essence is passive behavior, and to
“having a strength”, which in its essence is a proactive behavior.
Another measure has been proposed by Manescu (2011) and used in
Herzel, Nicolosi, and Sta˘rica˘ (2012). This is the difference between the














that ranges from -1 to +1. Averaging makes the measure comparable across
dimensions and years, but it is prone to another criticism: firms with a high
absolute number of strengths, which is however relatively small to the total
ni, and with a low number of weaknesses, relatively high to the total mi,
may get a negative score. This may happen when the numbers mi and ni
are far apart.
For any of these measures, the best-in-class adjusted score of a firm p in







i >I , (4)
9
and its overall score is then formed by averaging the best-in-class adjusted
scores ÊSG
j











where j = 1, 2, 3 labels the method used and < ESGji >I is the average
score in item i for stocks in the industry I.
Another proposal to rank companies without aggregating their ratings
is described in Statman and Glushkov (2009). In their analysis, the authors
do not aggregate over CSR dimensions, but define a top-overall company
as one that is in the top third of companies for at least two dimensions
but not in the bottom third by any dimension according to ÊSG
1
pi. In an
analogous way, a bottom-overall company is one that is in the bottom third
of companies by two or more characteristics, but not in the top third by any
others.
4.3 Categorical ordinal responses
Item Response model requires as input categorically ordered responses5,
that will be denoted by Ypi where p labels the company and i the KLD
characteristic. Although such variables can be constructed using any of
the three measures described in Section 4.2, we choose ESG3 defined in
Equation (3), as comparability across dimensions and years is needed and
as the negative meaning of concerns is retained. Moreover, in our sample,
firms with a negative value when the total strengths is greater then the total
concerns are extremely rare (about 2% of the cases).
The contingency table obtained by the cross-classifications of companies
according to ESG3 in all dimensions i is sparse.6 Sparsity reduces the
efficiency and reliability of the estimates and sometimes leads even to a
non-identifiability of the parameters. Moreover, specification of the model
requires that each item ranges over the same categories. For these reasons it
is necessary to reduce the dimensionality, hence we argued as follows. Firms
with negative ESG3 value on item i have raised relatively more concerns
than strengths on that item, and this information is more important than
the value of ESG3 itself, so we decided to group them together. The same
happens for firms with positive ESG3 value. Firms with zero ESG3 value
are considered neutral in terms of their performance on item i. We decided
therefore to form a three category response variable Ypi, as follows:
5Extension to unordered responses, not used here, exist, see De Boeck and Wilson,
2004, Ch. 3.
6As already explained in Section 4.1, sparsity of joint distribution is a feature of the
KLD dataset and it is not due to the particular aggregation scheme.
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(i) Ypi = −1 if ESG
3
pi < 0
(ii) Ypi = 0 if ESG
3
pi = 0
(iii) Ypi = 1 if ESG
3
pi > 0
This is not the unique choice we could adopt, and other strategies that led
to an ordinal response with more categories have been considered. However,
the contingency table of the data was still sparse for many of the years
considered, and computational problems were encountered when estimating
the model. The solution here proposed turned out to be the best, as the
model performed well in all years considered. The solution here proposed
accounts only part of the information given by the dataset but it earns in
efficiency of the estimates.
5 Polytomous Item Response Models
We here introduce the class of latent variable models used for our purposes,
i.e. the polytomous Item Response models (see De Boeck and Wilson, 2004).
The starting point is the set of categorically ordered responses Ypi built as
in the previous section. For each firm p, we modeled these responses as
expressions of a latent dimension η˜p, measuring the firm’s social responsi-
bility. The variable η˜p is supposed to be a stochastic variable whose prior
distribution is normal with zero mean and an unknown variance.
Item Response models give an expression of the probability of an indi-
vidual p to have a score Ypi in the item i not lower than category u, u ∈
{−1, 0, 1} conditionally to his/her latent ability η˜p. Mathematically this is
P (Ypi ≥ u | η˜p) = G(f(η˜p)), (6)
where G−1 is usually referred to as the link function, connecting the cate-
gorical inputs Ypi to the continuous distributed latent variable η˜p. In this
work, the Probit, that is the inverse of the standard normal cumulative
distribution function, is used for the link function.
Function f is a linear function of η˜p that has to be specified in order to
set the model. This function accounts for the capability of discrimination of
an item and for the difficulty that companies in different industries may have
to comply with different aspects of CSR. According to the Industrial Clas-
sification Benchmark (ICB), the following industries have been considered:
Basic Materials, Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, Financials, Health-
care, Industrials, Oil&Gas, Technology, Telecommunications, Utilities.
The following specification, corresponding to the Rasch model, is used
for f :





p + η˜p. (7)
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Coefficients ku are thresholds that differentiate between categories u, u ∈
{−1, 0, 1}. Such thresholds are modified by the biu parameters, depending
both on item i and category u. Notice that k−1 = ∞ and bi,−1 = 0 by
construction, as P (Ypi ≥ −1 | η˜p) = 1. The binary indicator D
r
p takes value
1 if firm p belongs to industry r, where label r runs over the industries.
Therefore βr captures the industry effect. High values indicate that firms
in industry r have higher difficulty in getting high scores than the others.
We define the overall difficulty for companies in industry r to have a score
higher than u in item i as the cutoff value Λi,r,u of the ability η˜ for which
the corresponding probability (6) is higher than 0.5:
Λi,r,u = − (ku + bi,u + βr) u = 0, 1. (8)
The cutoff relative to the single category u is not really important in
itself. What is relevant is the difference:
∆Λi = Λi,r,1 − Λi,r,0 = k0 + bi,0 − (k1 + bi,1), (9)
that may be interpreted as the capability of discrimination of an item i.
More discriminant items have higher values of this difference: the more the
difference, the higher the probability that an individual with a large (small)
value of the latent ability has a high (low) score. We call such a difference
the “discriminatory coefficient”. Let us note that in a dichotomous model
the only way to allow for different discrimination power of the items is to
add an item-dependent loading factor in front of the latent variable. As
a matter of fact, a large loading in a given item means that the further
apart individuals fall on the latent dimension the greater their differences
in giving a positive response to that item. In that case the discrimination
power of an item increases if the steepness of the probabilities defined in
Equation (6) for that item increases. Differently, in a polytomous model, the
discrimination of an item may vary also if the distance of the probabilities of
getting different scores in that item varies, even though its loading is equal
to 1.
The discrimination coefficient defined in Equation (9) does not depend
on the industry, as the model disentangles the item effect from the industry
effect, that instead is captured by βr. A more sophisticated model (with
different specification of function f), not supported by our data, could ac-
count also for a mixed term that makes the discriminatory coefficient of the
single item depend on the industry.7
The model is estimated by maximization of the marginal likelihood.
Identification constraints impose that, for industry Consumer Services, βr =
7Statistical measures based on AIC criteria show that this additional feature is unnec-
essary for the data at hand. For example in 2005 the AIC for the richer model is 8580 to
be compared with the AIC of the proposed model that is 7982. Results are similar also
for the other years.
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Estimated probability of a score u, u ∈ {−1, 0, 1} as a function of the ability for item (left panel)
Employment and (right panel) Human rights for companies in industry Financials (year 2007)
0 and, for item Community, biu = 0 for all categories u. Once the model is es-
timated, following the Bayes’ formula, the posterior distribution of the latent
variable η˜p is computed. The expected value of this posterior distribution is
taken as the CSR ability for company p, that we indicate with ηp. This is a
one dimensional variable that provides a synthesis of the multidimensional
nature of CSR behavior. It is built in a way that takes the industry effects
and the different discriminant power of each item into account. The largest
contribution to the ability is given from the most discriminant items. More-
over, given a set of scores, a company will have a higher ability if it belongs
to an industry r with a higher parameter βr.
To give a hint of the implications of the model, in Figure 2 the estimated
probability of a score u with respect to the ability for item Employment
(left panel) and Human rights (right panel) for companies in the industry
Financials in year 2007 is presented. The first one is a non discriminating
item with a small value of ∆Λ, as for a wide range of ability around zero
there is a rather substantial probability of each category u; on the contrary
the second one is a discriminating item, with a higher value of ∆Λ, as
low values of the ability give a high probability of u = −1, values around
zero of the ability give a high probability of u = 0 and high values of the
ability give a high probability of u = 1. Looking at the effect of industries,
in Figure 3 the probability of a response Y = 1 in item Environment for
different industries for year 2007 is reported as a function of the ability.
Curves are shifted according to the βr coefficients: companies belonging to
industries with probability shifted on the right need a high level of ability
to have Y = 1 on Environment. The figure shows that, in that year firms
in Oil&Gas have the greatest difficulty to present such a score, while firms
in industry Technology have the lowest difficulty. Since the industry effect
is disentangled from the item effect, this pattern repeats over other items.
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Figure 3: Estimated Probabilities for different industries




























Estimated probability of a score Y = 1 in item Environment for different industries (year 2007),
as a function of the ability
Furthermore, since βr does not depend on categories, it repeats also over
categories.
6 A discussion on the ability measure
To better understand the properties of the η measure, Table 2 (upper panel)







in each single CSR characteristics of International Busi-
ness Machines Corp. in 2004, a company belonging to industry Technology.
The averages of the ÊSG scores give the aggregated measures according to
the different methods. The first method gives an aggregated score of 0.44
while the second and third measures rate the stock 0.04 and 0.03 respec-
tively. All these three rankings pose the stock among the top 25% of stocks
in the same industry. The last column shows the ordinal responses used
as input of the Item Response model and the relative estimated value for
η, that is 0.06, in the third quartile of the industry distribution. The η
measure is not a linear combination of the ordinal responses. Rather, it is
a non linear function of the single scores that is most influenced by high
discriminant dimensions that, in 2004, according to the model estimates are
Human rights, Community, Environment and Product quality. Moreover
the way the scores are aggregated depends on the industry. This is the main
difference of the η-ranking from the other ranking proposed, where the best-
in-class industry adjusted scores for each item are averaged with the same
weights, independently from the industry.
To fully comprehend how these two features are incorporated by the
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Table 2: The role of different patterns of scores for ranking








COM 2 1 0.77 0.08 0.05 1
CGOV 1 2 -0.22 -0.03 -0.15 -1
DIV 5 0 3.71 0.34 0.52 1
EMP 3 2 0.62 0.06 0.06 1
ENV 0 2 -1.99 0.17 -0.29 -1
HUM 0 1 -0.74 -0.11 -0.19 -1
PRO 1 0 0.90 0.11 0.23 1
aggregated measure ranking-1 ranking-2 ranking-3 η-ranking
0.44 0.04 0.03 0.06
quartile IV IV IV III








COM 1 2 -0.22 -0.03 -0.15 -1
CGOV 2 1 0.77 0.08 0.05 1
DIV 5 0 3.71 0.34 0.52 1
EMP 3 2 0.62 0.06 0.06 1
ENV 0 2 -1.99 0.17 -0.29 -1
HUM 0 1 -0.74 -0.11 -0.19 -1
PRO 1 0 0.90 0.11 0.23 1
aggregated measure ranking-1 ranking-2 ranking-3 η-ranking
0.44 0.04 0.03 0.03
quartile IV IV IV III








COM 2 1 1.03 0.10 0.12 1
CGOV 1 2 -0.33 -0.05 -0.18 -1
DIV 5 0 4.79 0.44 0.66 1
EMP 3 2 1.15 0.10 0.16 1
ENV 0 2 -0.64 -0.05 -0.11 -1
HUM 0 1 -0.55 -0.08 -0.14 -1
PRO 1 0 1.24 0.16 0.31 1
aggregated measure ranking-1 ranking-2 ranking-3 η-ranking
0.96 0.09 0.12 0.19
quartile IV IV IV IV






of the single CSR characteristics, as well as the aggregated measures for International Business
Machines Corp. in 2004 (upper panel) in Technology and two hypothetical cases (lower panels).
Ordinal responses are reported in the last column, together with the ability measure ηp. The row
“quartile” indicates the quartile within the industry to which the company belongs, according
to each ranking. Intermediate panel shows ÊSG measures for a hypothetical company in the
same industry but with permutated scores. Lowest panel shows the case of another hypothetical
company with the same scores but in industry Oil&Gas.
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ability measure, the intermediate and lower panels show the ÊSG measures,
the ordinal responses and η for two hypothetical companies: the first one
in the same industry as International Business Machines Corp. but with
permutated scores (intermediate panel); the second with the same scores
but in a different industry, i.e. Oil&Gas (lower panel). Their ability is
calculated using the estimated coefficients.
In the first case, the strengths and concerns relative to Community are
permuted with those of Corporate Governance while all the other scores are
unchanged. Straightforward averages give the same aggregated ratings as for
International Business Machines Corp., because the averages do not depend
on the patterns. On the other hand, the value of η decreases to 0.03 because
the hypothetical company has now a negative score in Community that is
a highly discriminant dimension, while has a positive score in Corporate
Governance that has a low discriminant power. The influence of industry
is highlighted by the lower panel. The fact that the hypothetical company
belongs to a more difficult industry, Oil&Gas, makes the ability necessary
to have the same partial ratings increasing to 0.19. The result is in the forth
quartile of the Oil&Gas distribution.Notice that the ability measure does
not depend on any subjective choice of the relative importance to assign to
the different CSR characteristics.
Table 3 shows the average (over the period 1991-2007) number of stocks
per industry in the top 25% (upper panel) and bottom 25% (lower panel)
according to the η measure as well as the other three measures ÊSG
j
with
j = 1, 2, 3. The average numbers of stocks that are high(low) ranked for
both the η-ranking and one of the other three measures are also shown.
In the last two columns the table reports the average number of stocks
in the top(bottom)-overall sets defined in Statman and Glushkov (2009)
and their intersection with the high(low) ranked sets according to η. Most
of the stocks that are high(low) ranked according to η are also high(low)
ranked according to the other measures. For example, among the 12 stocks
in industry Basic Materials that are high ranked according to η, 11 out of
them are also high ranked according to ÊSG
1
, that instead counts 16 stocks.
Considering the same industry, only 6 stocks are in the top-overall set and 5
of them are also high ranked according to η. The same behavior is noticed
for the other industries. This means that the top(bottom)-overall procedure
selects a fewer number of stocks, and most of them are in the top(bottom)
25% of the η distribution.
We finally remark that the number of high(low) ranked companies can
be different according to the different measures considered. This is due to
the fact that for discrete distributions quantiles are not well defined. This
problem is overcome by using the η measure that instead has a continuous
distribution.
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Table 3: Portfolios’ size per industry















Basic Mat. 12 16 11 12 10 12 10 6 5
Cons. Goods 22 26 19 23 17 22 18 14 13
Cons. Services 25 33 22 25 20 25 22 17 15
Financials 21 28 18 21 15 22 16 10 8
Healthcare 12 15 10 12 9 13 9 7 5
Industrials 30 39 29 30 25 31 26 18 17
Oil&Gas 8 10 7 8 7 8 7 3 3
Technology 15 18 12 15 12 15 12 11 9
Telecom. 4 4 3 4 3 4 3 1 1
Utilities 12 16 11 12 10 13 10 7 6















Basic Mat. 12 15 11 12 10 13 10 7 6
Cons. Goods 22 28 20 22 19 22 18 10 9
Cons. Services 25 34 23 27 22 27 21 11 10
Financials 21 27 18 22 18 22 18 8 7
Healthcare 12 19 11 13 10 13 10 5 4
Industrials 30 37 28 31 26 31 25 16 15
Oil&Gas 8 10 7 8 6 8 7 5 4
Technology 15 20 13 16 12 16 13 4 4
Telecom. 4 5 3 4 3 4 3 2 2
Utilities 12 16 11 13 10 12 10 7 6
Average (over the period 1991-2007) number of stocks per industry in the top 25% (upper panel) and bottom 25% (lower panel) of the stocks according to the
η measure as well as the other 3 measures ÊSG
j
with j = 1, 2, 3. The average numbers of stocks that are high(low) ranked for both the η-ranking and one of
the other 3 measures are also shown. The last two columns show the average number of stocks in the top(bottom)-overall sets defined in Statman and Glushkov
(2009) and their intersection with the high(low) ranked sets according to η.
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Figure 4: Evolution over time of the industry effects






















Evolution over time of the industry effects as measured by βr coefficients, where r labels the
industries
7 Evolution over time of CSR aspects
Figure 4 shows the evolution of industry coefficients βr over time. Industry
Oil&Gas consistently presents the highest difficulty to meet CSR standards.
Industrials, Basic Materials and Telecommunications show a higher difficulty
than the reference industry, Consumer Services, contrary to what exhibited
by the industry Financials. Figure 5 shows the evolution over time of the dis-
criminatory coefficients for each item i. The picture exhibits a rather stable
behavior, especially after 1997. Human rights, Environment, Community
and Product quality are rather discriminant items.
After 1997, Governance was not a very discriminant dimension, as it
was very difficult to score 1 but also to score 0, and therefore the CSR
ability is not strongly influenced by the Governance. This is in line with
most of the literature regarding the effectiveness of the governance indices
in predicting corporate performances, see for example Bhagat, Bolton, and
Romano (2008). For almost all years, Employment and Diversity were the
easiest items both for score 0 and 1 and they were not discriminant. This
implies that the ability extracted from our model is less influenced by these
items.
8 Socially responsible stock selection
One of the most straightforward application of rankings is stock selection.
Rankings are formed according to the η measure (η-ranking), as well as
according to ÊSG
j
, j = 1, 2, 3 (ranking-j). Moreover, the top-overall,
bottom-overall ordering of Statman and Glushkov (2009) is also considered
18
Figure 5: Evolution over time of the discriminatory power of different items























Evolution over time of the discriminatory coefficients ∆Λi for all the items i
and it will be referred to as the “ranking-4”. On the basis of such rank-
ings, high and low ranked portfolios are formed, as explained in Section 8.1.
The aim of this section is to investigate the relationship between the port-
folios’ CSR performance, as measured by the η-ranking, as well as by the
other rankings considered for comparison, and the portfolios’ financial per-
formance, as measured by the Jensen’s α in the Carhart’s model (Carhart,
1997).
8.1 Portfolio construction
Best(worst)-in-class portfolios are formed by taking the top(bottom) 25%
of companies in each industry for all rankings but ranking-4, for which
portfolios are formed by companies in the top(bottom)-overall sets. This
guarantees that portfolios are well diversified across industries. Together
with the High (H) and Low (L) ranked portfolios, the High minus Low
(H − L) difference portfolios are also considered.
Concerning the portfolio weighting scheme, Equally Weighted (EW ),
Value Weighted (VW ) and mean-variance optimal portfolios are formed. In
the first and second scheme, portfolio weights are re-balanced at the begin-
ning of each month, while, for computational reasons, in the latter case they
are re-balanced at the beginning of each year. Notice that while the EW
and VW portfolios do not depend on any financial data, the optimal port-
folios mix the ex-ante mean-variance optimality with the CSR information.
An optimal portfolio, in the mean-variance sense, is a portfolio that, given
a certain level of expected return R, minimizes its variance keeping an ex-
pected return at least equal to R. A no short-selling constraint is imposed
in the optimization. Input data for optimal portfolio allocations, namely
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the vector of expected returns µ and the covariance matrix of the returns
Σ, were estimated similarly to Herzel et al. (2012), using the Carhart model
(Carhart, 1997) to compute Σ and making a market neutral forecasting as-
sumption for µ. In the construction of the optimal portfolios we set R as
the level of the market expected return. That is an intermediate level that
makes the optimal portfolios over the different subsets of allocation preserve
a certain degree of diversification.
8.2 Carhart’s model
To measure the financial performances of portfolios, the Carhart’s model
(Carhart, 1997) is implemented and the Jensen’s α’s are extracted.
The Carhart’s model takes styles into account, as differences in invest-
ment style can be very relevant in explaining the performance differences
between ethical and conventional funds (see e.g. Kurtz, 1997, or Guerard,
1997). Such model is used for example by Kempf and Osthoff (2007) or by
Statman and Glushkov (2009), who constructed their own indexes, and by
Bauer et al. (2005), who compared the performance of ethical and conven-
tional funds in different regions.
The Carhart model explains the portfolio excess return Rj,t − RFt over
the risk-free rate RFt of portfolio j at month t in terms of 4 risk factors:
Rj,t −RFt =αj + βj,1 (R
M
t −RFt) + βj,2 SMBt
+ βj,3HMLt + βj,4Momt + ϵj,t.
(10)
The factor RMt −RFt is the excess return of the market at time t, SMBt is
the return at time t of the small cap portfolio minus the large cap portfolio,
HMLt is the return at time t of the value stocks’ portfolio minus the growth
stocks’ portfolio, and Momt is the return at time t corresponding to the
momentum factor8. The intercept, Jensen’s α, gives the portfolio extra
return that cannot be obtained through the leverage to the risk factors. The
terms ϵj,t are the idiosyncratic errors and the β’s are the factor loadings of
portfolios over the risk factors.
8.3 Portfolio risk-adjusted performances
The results for the Carhart’s model are summarized in Table 4 for the EW ,
VW and optimal portfolios constructed on the basis of the η-ranking. The
table shows the ordinary least square estimates of the coefficients of the
regressions together with their significance at levels 1%, 5% and 10%, indi-
cated respectively with ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗. The levels of significance are computed
taking a Newey-West correction into account. The Jensen’s α is annualized
and expressed as a percentage. The adjusted R2 is also shown in the last col-
umn. First we comment on the α’s. We are mainly interested in comparing
8The time series of the risk factors were downloaded from the K. R. French’s web site.
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Table 4: Carhart’s model estimate for Equally Weighted (EW ) Value
Weighted (VW ) and optimal best-in-class portfolios
α(%) Mkt SMB HML Mom R2
adj
EW Hη 1.78 0.88∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ −0.17∗∗∗ 0.80
Lη 0.95 1.01∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ −0.28∗∗∗ 0.84
Hη − Lη 0.82 −0.13∗∗∗ 0.01 -0.07∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.31
VW Hη 3.59∗∗∗ 0.80∗∗∗ -0.07 −0.17∗∗∗ −0.16∗∗∗ 0.81
Lη 0.11 0.88∗∗∗ −0.15∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗ 0.79
Hη − Lη 3.49∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗ 0.08 −0.36∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗∗ 0.31
optimal Hη 2.65∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗ 0.03 0.15∗∗∗ −0.18∗∗∗ 0.81
Lη 0.66 0.91∗∗∗ -0.04 0.24∗∗∗ −0.21∗∗∗ 0.82
Hη − Lη 1.99∗∗ −0.09∗∗∗ 0.07∗ −0.09∗∗∗ 0.03 0.13
Carhart’s model estimate for equally weighted (EW ), value weighted (VW ) and optimal best in
class portfolios from January 1992 to December 2008. The table shows the OLS estimates of the
coefficients. The α’s are annualized and expressed as a percentage. The significance at the 1%,
5% or 10% level is indicated respectively with ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗. The p-values, not shown in the
table, are computed by taking a Newey-West correction into account. The rows labeled with Hη,
Lη report the results for portfolios constructed respectively over the highest and lowest ranked
companies per industry according to the η-ordering. The rows labeled with Hη − Lη show the
results for the long-short portfolios.
the risk-adjusted performances of high ranked portfolios with the low ranked
ones. Therefore we focus on the long-short positions. The α coefficients of
high minus low portfolios are positive, and significant in the case of VW and
optimal portfolios with respectively a value of 3.49% and 1.99%. The posi-
tive performances of the long/short portfolios are mainly driven by the high
ranked portfolios that in fact have α’s positive, and significant for the VW
and optimal weightings, with respectively 3.59% and 2.65%. These results
agree with the hypothesis of a positive relationship between the portfolios’
CSR performance and their financial performance.
Concerning the other factors in the Carhart’s model, we observe from
Table 4, that the market and the book to market ratio loadings of the high
minus low portfolios are always negative and statistically significant. This
means that the high ranked portfolios are usually less exposed to the market
factor and are invested more in growth stocks (low book to market ratio)
than value stocks (high book to market) compared to the low ranked port-
folios. These findings are in line with those in Bauer et al. (2005), in Kempf
and Osthoff (2007), and in Statman and Glushkov (2009). Interestingly, we
notice that the high ranked EW portfolios are more tilted towards stocks
with high momentum than the low ranked ones (in line with results for top-
overall minus bottom-overall strategies in Statman and Glushkov, 2009),
while the high ranked VW portfolios are more invested in stocks with a
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negative momentum with respect to the low ranked ones.
To check for robustness over the cut-off, portfolios have been constructed
also by considering the median value of the η distribution within each in-
dustry as the cutoff. Results are in agreement with those already shown and
we do not detail them here9. In general, when a coefficient is significantly
different from zero for a portfolio built with respect to the median values,
then that result (in terms of either p-value or magnitude) is even strength-
ened in a portfolio built with respect to the quartiles. Moreover, in some
cases we observed non significant coefficients of the portfolios formed with
respect to the median values that became significant in the other case.
To check for robustness of the findings on α’s against the estimation
window, the overall period is further divided into two subperiods: January
1992 - December 2000 and January 2001 - December 2008. Table 5 shows
the annualized α’s estimated over the two subperiods, and their significance.
For comparison, Table 5 reports also the results, for the portfolios that are
high and low ranked according to the other orderings. The table shows that
the η-ranking gives robust α’s over the different subperiods, but significance
may decrease due to the shorter periods considered. Concerning the other
rankings, it is remarkable that the risk-adjusted returns, estimated on the
whole period, of the long-short strategies based on ranking-1, ranking-
2, and ranking-3 are never significant. Moreover, their sign changes from
positive in the first subperiod to negative in the second one, even though
in the most of the cases results are not significant. Ranking-2 corresponds
to the aggregation scheme (combination1) in Kempf and Osthoff (2007).
Their main findings concern a positive and significant α over the period
1992-2004 of the long-short position for VW portfolios with 10% cut-off
(further checked with 25% cut-off). The analogous parameter here is not
significant. This may be due to the different period and different weighting
scheme (weights in their paper are formed at the beginning of each year and
kept constant until the end of the year).
Contrary to ranking-1, ranking-2, and ranking-3, and similarly to η-
ranking, ranking-4 provides robust results over the two subperiods. In par-
ticular, the risk adjusted returns estimated on the overall period is positive,
and significant for EW and VW weighting schemes. This ranking corre-
sponds to the top-overall bottom-overall approach of Statman and Glushkov
(2009), and our results are quite similar to theirs, although on a different
investment set.
9 Conclusions
Corporate Social Responsibility has a multidimensional nature. Companies
with a policy of responsibility have to comply with standards related to
9Those results are available upon request.
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Table 5: Comparison between rankings. Jensen’s alphas in the Carhart model for EW , VW , and optimal best in class
portfolios in different subperiods
1992-2008 1992-1999 2000-2008
EW VW optimal EW VW optimal EW VW optimal
Hη 1.78 3.59∗∗∗ 2.65∗∗ 2.11∗ 5.26∗∗∗ 3.34∗∗∗ 2.13 1.48 2.09
Lη 0.95 0.11 0.66 0.96 1.86 1.05 0.60 -1.69 0.36
Hη − Lη 0.82 3.49∗∗∗ 1.99∗∗ 1.15 3.40∗ 2.30∗ 1.53 3.16∗ 1.73
H1 2.08 2.56∗∗ 2.27∗∗ 2.89∗∗ 4.05∗∗∗ 3.54∗∗∗ 1.33 -0.18 0.52
L1 1.76 1.81 2.38∗∗ 1.18 2.04 1.66 2.03 1.63 3.20∗
H1− L1 0.32 0.75 -0.12 1.71∗ 2.01 1.88∗ -0.70 -1.81 -2.68
H2 1.54 1.93 1.61 2.72∗∗ 3.78∗∗ 3.21∗∗ 0.81 -0.44 0.22
L2 1.76 1.81 1.98∗∗ 1.24 1.91 1.47 1.66 1.38 2.50
H2− L2 -0.22 0.12 -0.37 1.48 1.87 1.74 -0.85 -1.82 -2.28
H3 1.60 2.22∗ 1.71 2.33∗ 4.00∗∗∗ 2.95∗∗ 1.14 -0.38 0.26
L3 1.17 0.58 1.39 0.80 1.18 1.20 1.38 0.05 1.94
H3− L3 0.43 1.63 0.31 1.54 2.82 1.75 -0.24 -0.43 -1.67
H4 2.88∗∗ 4.34∗∗∗ 2.59∗ 3.27∗∗ 4.82∗∗ 3.18∗ 3.06 2.48 1.57
L4 -0.63 -1.82 1.03 -0.60 0.27 -0.55 -1.08 -2.72 2.19
H4− L4 3.51∗∗ 6.17∗∗∗ 1.56 3.87∗∗ 4.55 3.73∗∗ 4.14 5.19∗ -0.63
Comparison of the α’s for EW , VW , and optimal best in class portfolios constructed according to different rankings. The table shows the OLS estimates of the
alphas in the whole period 1992-2008 as well as in the two subperiods 1992-1999 and 2000-2008. The α’s are annualized and expressed as a percentage. The
significance at the 1%, 5% or 10% level is indicated respectively with ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗. The p-values, not shown in the table, are computed by taking a Newey-West
correction into account. The rows labeled with H and L report the results for portfolios constructed respectively over the highest and lowest ranked companies
per industry according to every orderings. The rows labeled with Hη − Lη show the results for the long-short portfolios according to the different orderings.
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various aspects, that present different challenges. Therefore, when measur-
ing the level of CSR compliance of a firm, different aspects have to be given
different weights. Furthermore, Industry membership can also be highly rel-
evant. We implemented an Item Response model that provides a univariate
measure of the CSR compliance of a firm, in such a way that the different
aspects of CSR are weighted according to their capacity to discriminate so-
cially responsible companies from the others and that the Industry effect is
explicitly accounted for. We called such a measure “CSR ability”.
The model has been applied to the KLD ratings of companies belonging
to the S&P500 index and/or to the KLD 400 Domini Social index, covering
the period form 1991 to 2007. Findings indicate that firms in the industry
Oil&Gas have the higher difficulty to comply with the CSR standards, fol-
lowed by the ones in Industrials, Basic Materials and Telecommunications.
It means that, given the same pattern of CSR ratings, the model assigns
a higher CSR ability to a company in Oil&Gas than to a company in Fi-
nancials. Human rights, Environment, Community and Product quality are
the most discriminant items and therefore they influence the CSR ability
more than the other KLD aspects. On the contrary, Governance is not a
discriminant item.
According to the CSR ability measure, high and low ranked portfolios
were formed and their risk adjusted returns compared. Results show that
portfolios of stocks that are high ranked according to the proposed measure
outperformed portfolios of low ranked stocks in terms of risk adjusted re-
turns. The results for the long/short strategies are statistically significant
for the value weighted and optimal portfolios, and are robust against the
estimation period. Let us note that what we actually find is an association
between CSR and financial performance. However the analysis performed
does not give any information on the causality direction. Reverse causality
may also explain results since companies which are better performing may
afford corporate social responsibility practices. For comparison reasons, dif-
ferent investment strategies were formed also on the basis of other three CSR
aggregated measures appeared in the literature, as well as the top(bottom)-
overall approach proposed by Statman and Glushkov (2009). Results on
the risk adjusted performance of the long/short position are statistically
significant and robust only for the last case.
In conclusion, investigations based on the proposed measure support
the hypothesis of a positive relationship between compliance with CSR and
financial performances. Weights of the different dimensions to form an ag-
gregated measure of CSR are determined by the Item Response model itself
and do not have to be chosen a priori.
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